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Rosenburg Living Trust v. MacDonald Highlands Realty, LLC C/W 70478, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 
69 (Sept. 13, 2018) (en banc)1 
 
PROPERTY LAW: IMPLIED RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, DISCLOSURE DUTIES 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined that Nevada law does not recognize implied restrictive covenants 
based on a common development scheme, and the Court did not adopt the doctrine under these 
facts.  Additionally, the Court held that, unlike common law disclosure requirements, claims 
arising from the duties of a licensee under NRS Chapter 645 could not be waived. Finally, it held 
that attorney fees and costs should only be awarded where a claim is without reasonable ground, 
or to harass the prevailing party.  
 
Background 
 
In 2012, Shahin Malek purchased a lot in the MacDonald Highlands master planned 
community, situated around Dragon Ridge Golf Course.  Malek’s purchase included an out-of-
bounds parcel situated between his lot and the ninth hole of the golf course.  In order to purchase 
this parcel, Malek needed to have the lot rezoned from public/semi-public to residential. Malek 
followed the proper rezoning process with no objection, including the then owner of the 
neighboring lot who received notice. Subsequently, the Frederic and Barbara Rosenburg Living 
Trust (the Trust) purchased the neighboring lot. When the Trust discovered the purchase of the 
out-of-bounds parcel, it filed a complaint against the MacDonald parties and Malek seeking to 
establish an implied restrictive covenant to restrict Malek from building on the out-of-bounds 
parcel, and an easement across the parcel. The Trust further sought monetary damages against the 
MacDonald parties for negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and real estate broker 
violations under NRS Chapter 645.         
The district court granted the MacDonald parties and Malek’s motions for summary 
judgment on all the Trust’s claims. The district found that as a matter of law, Nevada does not 
recognize the types of covenants and easements the Trust sought, and the Trust voluntarily waived 
any claims it may have against the MacDonald parties. Subsequently, the district court awarded 
the MacDonald parties and Malek attorney fees and costs. This appeal followed.    
 
Discussion 
 
The district court did not err in concluding that Nevada law has not recognized an implied 
restrictive covenant for use  
 
 Nevada law has never recognized implied restrictive covenants in the context of common 
development schemes.2 To support their position, the Trust argued that the Court recognized an 
implied restrictive covenant in Shearer v. City of Reno.3 However, the Court distinguished Shearer 
from the present case.  In Shearer, a landowner sold a group of lots with the express agreement 
                                                        
1  By Scott Cooper. 
2  See. Probasco v. City of Reno, 85 Nev. 563, 459 P.2d 772, 774 (1969). 
3  Shearer v. City of Reno, 36 Nev. 443, 136 P. 707 (1913). 
not to build on them.  The landowner further dedicated the lots to the public for all time, and even 
filed a plat declaring so. In the present case, there was no express agreement and no public use 
dedication. During oral argument, the Trust conceded that there was never an express agreement 
that the out-of-bounds parcel would remain a part of the golf course, or that the golf course would 
even remain a golf course. Additionally, there is no public dedication for the golf course. Instead, 
those who wish to use the golf course must have a membership or pay to play. For these reasons, 
the Court found that the Trust is not seeking the kind of implied restrictive covenant found in 
Shearer, and therefore the Trust’s argument fails. 
 Furthermore, the Trust argued that their position is supported by Boyd v. McDonald.4 In 
Boyd, the Court recognized implied easements for ingress and egress across another’s property. 
However, this is not what the Trust is seeking. The Court explained that an implied easement gives 
a person the right to use the land of another in some way or another. The Trust is not seeking to 
use the land of another, rather it is seeking to restrict the land of another.  For this reason, the Court 
held that Boyd is inapplicable to the relief the Trust seeks, and makes clear an implied easement 
and an implied restrictive covenant are two distinct doctrines. Therefore, the relief the Trust seeks 
is not obtainable under Boyd.     
Additionally, even if the Court were to adopt the doctrine, the Trust has not proved the 
elements required. An implied restrictive covenant may arise when the following elements are 
proven: 1) there is a common grantor, 2) the property subject to restriction is designated, 3) a 
general plan or scheme of restrictions exists for the property, and 4) the restrictions run with the 
land.5 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged other jurisdictions do apply this doctrine, they do so 
with extreme caution.6 While the Trust established the first element, they failed to prove the other 
three. Primarily, the Trust failed to prove that the common grantor, MacDonald Highlands, 
intended to place any restrictions on the out-of-bounds parcel. There is no evidence in the record 
that MacDonald ever intended for the out-of-bounds parcel to remain a part of the golf course for 
perpetuity. Further, the record does not prove that Malek and his predecessors had actual or 
constructive notice of that restriction. Therefore, even if the Court were to adopt the doctrine of 
implied restrictive covenants for common development schemes, the district court was correct in 
granting the motion for summary judgement on the implied restrictive covenant. 
 
The Trust waived its common law, but not statutory, claims against the MacDonald parties 
 
 Generally, “[n]ondisclosure by the seller of adverse information concerning real property 
. . . will not provide the basis for an action by the buyer to rescind or for damages when the property 
is sold ‘as is.’”7  Based on the record, the Trust expressly agreed to inspect the property and bore 
the responsibility of ensuring it was suitable before closing. As a result, by agreeing to purchase 
the lot “as is”, the Trust waived its common law claims for negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent 
or intentional misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment against the MacDonald parties.  
 However, the Trust did not waive their claims under NRS 645.252.8 NRS 645.252 provides 
that any licensee acting as a real estate agent in a transaction shall disclose any material information 
                                                        
4  Boyd v. McDonald, 81 Nev. 642, 408 P.2d 717 (1965). 
5  20 AM. JUR. 2d Covenants Etc. § 156 (2015). 
6  Id.  
7  Mackintosh v. Jack Matthews & Co., 109 Nev. 628, 633, 855 P.2d 549, 552 (1993). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 645.252 (2017). 
that the agent knows or should have known to each party in the real estate transaction.9  However, 
with the exception of the duty to present all offers to clients, NRS 645.255 prevents the duties of 
a licensee under NRS 645.252 from being waived.10 Accordingly, the Trust could not have waived 
their statutory claims and should be able to maintain their statutory claims against the MacDonald 
parties. Therefore, summary judgment on the statutory claims against the MacDonald parties was 
inappropriate. Additionally, where the underlying decision of a district court is reversed making 
the recipient of the costs the prevailing party, the costs should also be reversed.11 Since the Trust’s 
statutory claims survive, it was inappropriate for the district court to award attorney fees and costs 
to the MacDonald parties. 
 
The district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to Malek 
 
 NRS 18.010(2)(b) allows the district court to award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing 
party if a claim is brought or maintained “without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing 
party.”12 The district court found that after Malek filed his motion for summary judgement the 
Trust frivolously maintained its lawsuit against Malek. While the current jurisprudence in Nevada 
does support the Trust’s position, their case was not without reasonable ground or to harass Malek. 
Instead, the Court saw the claim as a novel legal issue and public policy does not support punishing 
a party presenting a novel legal issue. Therefore, the district court’s award of attorney fees and 
costs to Malek is reversed.          
 
Conclusion 
 
Nevada law has never recognized implied restrictive covenants based on common 
development schemes, and the Court declined to adopt the doctrine here.  Furthermore, the Trust 
could not waive their claims under NRS Chapter 645, so the district court’s granting of summary 
judgment and attorney fees and costs in favor of the MacDonald parties is reversed.  Finally, the 
Court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting Malek attorney fees and costs 
because the Trust’s claims were not without reasonable grounds or meant to harass Malek.  
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